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Abstract 
Although the launch of the euro went better than many expected, sluggish growth, persistent 
unemployment and growing disenchantment with key elements of the economic governance system 
have led to demands for change, especially in policy coordination. This paper examines the 
criticisms of economic policy in the EU and the mechanisms through which it is coordinated, and 
considers how the EMU policy system might be reformed. It points to problems and paradoxes in 
the way economic governance operates, notably those surrounding its ability to deliver a coherent 
policy mix that brings together monetary fiscal and supply-side policies. The paper concludes with 
a discussion of whether gouvernment économique might offer a way forward. 
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Introduction 
 
Economic and monetary union (EMU) is, undoubtedly, a unique and bold experiment. Although the introduc-
tion of the euro went well, the economic management of the EU as a whole, and the euro area in particular, 
have been subject to increasing condemnation. Awkward questions are being asked about the rationale and 
arrangements for economic policy coordination (see, for example, Pisani-Ferry, 2002). Indeed, since the in-
ception of the euro in 1999 and even during the period of convergence that preceded it, there has been a 
steady stream of criticism about the EU’s emerging system of economic governance (Buiter et al., 1993; 
Boyer, 2002). In particular, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – never loved – is in trouble and appears to 
have been undermined by a reluctance to abide by its terms on the part of large Member States, one of which 
– Germany – is the very country that demanded it.  
 
The record so far… 
Despite these concerns EMU has, in many respects, exceeded expectations. The machinery for decision mak-
ing on monetary policy functions effectively and few people look back nostalgically to national monetary 
policymaking. The introduction of euro notes and coins has been so smooth that the catalogue of horror 
stories that the more euro-skeptic press, notably in the UK,
1 had looked forward to publishing lies moulder-
ing in the archives. A first economic downturn, exacerbated by the tragic events of 9/11, has been weath-
ered, even if the recovery has been halting, and the various elements of the policy system appear to have 
done their jobs broadly as intended.  
 
Gradually, too, economic governance of the euro area (and the EU as a whole) is being fleshed out as mo-
dalities for policies complementary to monetary policy are established. The various committees responsible 
for developing policy, such as the Economic and Financial Committee (successor to the old Monetary Com-
mittee, focusing on the shorter term) and the Economic Policy Committee (more concerned with longer-term 
macroeconomic matters) are reported to function effectively. Ecofin, the body that, in principle, is the custo-
dian of the “E” in EMU, often has to balance the interests of Member States and this can raise problems in the 
coordination of Member State policies called for in Article 99. But it is, perhaps, worth stressing that, con-
trary to the experience of the past twenty years, Member States have avoided marked budgetary imbalances, 
although the recent “lapses” by Germany, Portugal and France could become problematic. 
 
However, the EU now has to confront sluggish growth, persistent unemployment and an apparent inability to 
deal with weaknesses in the supply side of the economy. As successive forecasts are scaled back,
2 the opti-
mism surrounding the launch of the euro just four years ago has been replaced by a pervasive feeling of 
gloom. Rather than looking with envy at Ireland, many are now looking with trepidation at what has hap-
pened in Japan since 1990. What is less clear is whether the difficulties now apparent are the result of policy 
mistakes, flaws in the architecture of the EMU policy system, or the impact of longer-run changes that have 
been inadequately analyzed and dealt with.  
 
With enlargement of the EU now agreed, a fresh look at the structure of economic policy in Europe is, there-
fore, warranted and timely. There are growing doubts about whether key components of economic policy – 
notably the SGP and the monetary policy strategy followed by the European Central Bank (ECB) – are doing 
their job. More generally, questions have to be asked about the inability of the policy system to deliver a co-
herent policy mix and the lack of flexibility in the conduct of policy (House of Lords, 2003). In particular, it 
                                                 
1In the autumn of 2001, the economics editor of one prominent British tabloid told the author that his newspaper al-
ready had such stories on file, ready to be brought out when notes and coins went “live.” 
2The latest Commission biannual forecasts, published in April 2003, have emulated those from the four previous rounds 
in having lower growth projections for the next two years (Commission, 2003a) than those published six months be-
fore. 
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is worth asking what the evidence reveals about whether the right choices have been made about how policy 
is coordinated. 
The questions about economic policy coordination are many and there are strongly held views about its ex-
tent or form (see the contributions to: the special issue of Empirica, Vol 26, 3, published in September 1999; 
Brunila et al., 2001; Buti et al. 2002; and Begg, 2002). How much coordination should there be? Should it 
be confined to individual policy areas or have a wider remit to cut across policy borders, perhaps even lead-
ing to outcomes where bargaining occurs on the settings of different policies? Should it be formal or tacit? 
What legal and institutional reforms will be needed if coordination is to be enhanced? Advocates of firm 
rules, drawing on the seminal contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Rogoff (1985), appeared to 
have won the battle to shape the EU policy system by tying the hands of both fiscal and monetary policy-
makers. Yet it is the rigid application of these firm rules that is now in the dock, witness Prodi’s clarifica-
tions of his “stupid” comments on the SGP.  
 
There is, however, more to the EU system than simple rules for the two sides of demand management. The 
system brings together very different mechanisms of coordination, using a mixture of  rules and obligations 
that are backed by ‘hard’ law and non-binding agreements that operate through “soft” law mechanisms such 
as peer review, benchmarking and exchange of experience (for a succinct description, see Commission, 
2002a). Although the only dimension of economic policy to which the open method of coordination (OMC) 
is formally applied is employment policy, soft forms of coordination operate in a number of other ways, 
most notably through the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs). 
 
This paper examines the criticisms of economic policy in the EU and the mechanisms through which it is 
coordinated and considers how the EMU policy system might be reformed. The next section reviews the 
emerging system of economic governance in the EU (and specifically EMU), and points to where, and how, 
hard and soft mechanisms apply. The subsequent section discusses some of the problems and apparent para-
doxes inherent in the system, then prospects are discussed. Concluding remarks complete the paper. 
 
The policy architecture 
EMU is a system of economic governance in which the different elements – monetary policy, fiscal policy 
and supply-side policies – have been brought together in a policy framework that differs markedly from 
those of Member States. Yet it is often analyzed as though it is little more than a narrow reassignment of 
interest rate policy to the supranational level. In fact, the new policy regime combines a specific philosophy 
of economic policy, a novel distribution of responsibility between the national and supranational levels of 
economic governance, and a reconfiguration of policy instruments and targets. It is easy to forget just how 
profound the change is. In addition, because of political imperatives that have resulted in a delicate balance 
of power between Member States and the supranational level, EMU has also had to establish means of coor-
dinating a range of national policies in a much more explicit and ordered manner than the largely informal 
arrangements seen at the level of the G7/G8. Only the post-war Bretton Woods system came close to the 
scope of demand-side coordination now in place in the EU, and there is no obvious parallel for the supply 
side. 
 
Since the late 1980s, a consensus has developed on the broad orientation of economic policy that can be 
characterized as “stability orientated.” The essence of the approach, which is at the heart of EMU, is that 
macroeconomic policy should focus primarily on limiting the volatility of output and prices. The Treaty ex-
plicitly requires the ECB to assure price stability. Fiscal policy remains with Member States, but there are ob-
ligations to maintain the soundness of public finances, backed up by the SGP rules. The aggregate effect is to 
limit the scope for discretionary macroeconomic policy and this, in turn, places more of the burden of adjust-
ment on the supply side of the economy, especially the labor market. A characterization is that the role of 
monetary policy (and thus the ECB) is to deal with system-wide economic effects – including symmetric 
shocks – while national autonomy (fiscal and supply-side policies) is retained to deal with effects specific to 
the Member State – notably asymmetric shocks. This division of tasks leads to two immediate practical con-
siderations (Buti et al., 2001). First, for fiscal policy to fulfill its adjustment role, there has to be a margin to   4
allow the automatic stabilizers to work. The gap between “close to balance or in surplus” and the 3 percent 
hard threshold for the deficit in the SGP is justified by this aim. Second, the longer-term sustainability of 
public finances – especially, though not exclusively, in relation to pension commitments – requires attention 
to public-sector balance sheets. So long as nominal GDP grows, maintaining the public finances in balance 
will lead to a progressive reduction in public debt as a proportion of GDP, thereby providing scope for deal-
ing with long-term concerns.  
 
But there are also occasions when increased public expenditure is required in the short to medium term for 
other than cyclical reasons or today’s geopolitical imperatives. The new members of the EU, for example, 
are bound to have substantial public investment needs, just as Spain and Portugal had after they joined the 
Union. More generally, the ambitions articulated at the Lisbon European Council to effect a transformation 
of the EU economy will have expenditure implications. The problem with the current policy framework is 
that such aims cannot easily be accommodated. 
 
Monetary policy and the approach of the ECB 
The ECB has regularly been castigated for obduracy in the assertion of its independence, too narrow an inter-
pretation of its primary target of price stability and a lack of sensitivity to apparently worsening general eco-
nomic conditions in the euro area. In practice, though, the decisions on interest rates have mostly been about 
right: some rate changes could have been a month or two sooner or been fifty rather than twenty-five basis 
points, but these are fine technical judgements. The Federal Reserve  has, manifestly, been more activist in 
its approach, but monetary policy is a slow acting instrument and excessive changes can be counterproduc-
tive, so that again it is a moot point whether the Fed or the ECB has followed the best route. 
 
Nevertheless, a key worry about the ECB is that its 2 percent reference value for price stability is simply too 
low, resulting in a reluctance to cut interest rates when there is no obvious risk of inflation. Moreover, both 
the reference value and the target for monetary growth have consistently been exceeded, casting doubt on 
the credibility of the targets (de Grauwe, 2002). The remedy is straightforward: a higher reference value and, 
possibly, adoption of a symmetrical target similar to that in the UK, as has recently been advocated by two 
prominent French economists (Fitoussi and Creel, 2002). 
 
It is also accepted that the decision-making procedures of the ECB will have to change after enlargement, be-
cause the addition of up to fifteen additional national central bank governors would make the Governing 
Council too unwieldy. The ECB itself has come up with a complex proposal involving rotation of Members 
within groups of countries and uneven voting weights instead of the present one member one vote arrange-
ment and this has now been endorsed by the Council, in spite of misgivings on all sides. The more radical 
solutions of a monetary policy committee or giving the decision to a beefed-up executive have been rejected 
(see de Grauwe, 2002). The trouble with the proposed compromise is that it will leave the decision-making 
body larger than at present and open to the charge that national governors will vote on national rather than 
euro area grounds. 
 
Fiscal policy and the dilemmas of coordination 
Although fiscal policy in the EU remains a competence of Member States, it is subject to constraints em-
bodied in the SGP. From a theoretical perspective, the reasons for restricting the ability of individual Member 
States to borrow can be summarized under two main headings: 
 
– First, there may be a collective cost if some countries are fiscally profligate, insofar as the aggre-
gate effect is inflationary and, as a direct result, the ECB has to impose tighter monetary policy than 
if fiscal policy had been more restrained. The outcome is adverse for the fiscally virtuous as well as 
the sinners. 
– Second, the credibility of the ECB will rest, in part, on its ability to resist pressures to monetize 
debt. If Member States face limited market sanctions, they will have incentives to raise debt levels,   5
engendering risks of a need for a bailout. If the ECB’s credibility is damaged, then again the euro 
area as a whole will be the loser. 
 
 
The SGP does not, however, work in isolation. On the one hand, it is just one component in the increasingly 
elaborate machinery for policy coordination at EU level (see chart). Policy coordination can be defined in 
this context as supranational rules or norms which are agreed upon by all Member States, leave primary re-
sponsibility for the policy area with national authorities, but set limits on their discretion. The Broad Eco-
nomic Policy Guidelines also set parameters for fiscal policy and some Member States have internal rules as 
well. 
 
What is conspicuously missing however, is any formal means of coordination between fiscal and monetary 
policy, the conventional notion of the policy mix. As the chart shows, there is provision for dialogue be-
tween monetary policy and other policy domains, but no overt channels for joint decision making, although 
there are the two mechanisms shown for exchanges of views, including the political forum of the Eurogroup. 
Thus, on one of the key issues of policy management, it is soft procedures which dominate and which, in 
practice, represent the sole means of arriving at an overall macroeconomic policy orientation. One conse-
quence of this arrangement is that opportunities for normative input into the choice of policy are severely 
circumscribed, so that the underlying “stability” model is not subject to challenge. 
 
 
 
Nor does the Pact have any means of adding up the individual deficits to arrive at an EU-wide fiscal stance. 
If the collective fiscal position is too loose, the ECB would, ceteris paribus, be expected to react by keeping 
interest rates higher, and vice versa (for a discussion, see Allsopp, 2002). The result is that the aggregate fis-
cal policy of the euro area Member States will not necessarily be consistent with monetary policy, nor will 
the resulting policy mix always be suitable for the economic circumstances and could be asymmetric in the 
manner in which it functions. The asymmetry arises because, although the SGP has clear rules for preventing 
excessive deficits, it has no provisions for dealing with fiscal positions that might be problematic for other 
reasons. An excessive surplus could, for instance, have spillover effects on other economies in much the 
same way as a deficit does, if in the opposite direction. 
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The fiscal rules have also been condemned as economically illiterate, an accusation levelled most vocally, 
and with characteristic robustness, by Willem Buiter (Buiter et al., 1993; see also Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 
1998), but also a critique that has wide support in the economics profession, if not in cognate disciplines. In 
essence, it is that there is no underlying rationale for having arbitrary limits on deficits, because govern-
ments should be free to choose – taking whatever consequences there are for borrowing costs or intergenera-
tional equity. Moreover, a single reference value such as the 3 percent deficit ceiling is highly unlikely to be 
correct for all countries at the same time or all the time. Some may have a need for higher public investment 
to remedy deficiencies in infrastructure or to bolster the technological  base – such as the UK today or the 
Central and Eastern European Countries tomorrow – while others might need to engage in net public sav-
ings, either to run down excessive debt or in anticipation of future pension demands – Italy is the obvious 
example.  
 
Yet there is a contrary case that typically troubles economists while being persuasive to the legal scholars. 
This is that without the anchor of simple rules enshrined in hard law, policy anarchy is much more probable. 
The nature of the rules may be doubtful or at variance with the inferences drawn from the economic reason-
ing, but as political economy devices which help to keep policymakers on course, they can have a pragmatic 
impact that belies their questionable theoretical rationale. This is just one example of the importance in 
thinking about how to run EMU of how the juridical viewpoint can enrich the economic analysis (see, for ex-
ample, Louis, 2002). 
 
Supply-side policies 
On the face of it, the supply side is well covered in the policy framework, with explicit processes covering 
employment (Luxembourg) and product market reform (Cardiff), topped up by the looser ambitions agreed 
at the 2000 Lisbon European Council. The European Employment Strategy (EES) has, arguably, contributed 
to a general rethinking of how labor-market adjustment can be achieved, although it is open to the criticism 
that too many of the guidelines are tangential to a genuine adjustment strategy, with their focus more on acti-
vation and equity related aims. This is, in part, because the focus of the EES has been on employment poli-
cies per se and not on the broader contribution that they might make to steering the economy. But it is also 
because the links from the Luxembourg process to other structural reform measures have been inadequately 
developed in the institutional framework. In particular, the hard parts of labor-market reform, notably the 
flexibility of wages and of the regulatory framework, are only tangentially affected by the Luxembourg 
process and outside the scope of the Cardiff process, even though the BEPGs have, for several years, ritually 
called on Member States to speed up labor-market reform: thus, chapter 3 of the guidelines in 2002 was 
headed “Invigorate labour markets.” Yet even here, the detailed recommendations stop short of confronting 
these two dimensions of flexibility convincingly.  
 
Although the Commission review of the 2002 BEPGs offers a broadly favorable assessment of how the 
labor-market recommendations have been implemented, signs are detected that the pace of reform may have 
slowed, while hidden away is the statement that “reforms of employment protection legislation (EPL) have 
received little or no attention” (Commission, 2003b: p.25). 
 
Criticisms of the policy framework 
 
Although there have been no evident policy disasters so far, the system for economic governance is in a pe-
riod of “learning by doing” and has to evolve in a number of directions to fulfill its role. The current phase 
of stagnation of the EU economy, now forecast (Commission, 2003b) to persist throughout 2003 and with 
forecasts for 2004 also having been reined back, is putting additional stress on the SGP’s credibility. Italy is 
now expected to join France and Germany in exceeding the 3 percent reference value which means that the 
three largest economies – over two thirds of the euro area GDP – would be in breach of the rules. Although 
formal excessive deficit procedures have now been launched against Germany and  Portugal, with a warning 
issued to France, and Italy possibly next in line, there is little sign that these formal procedures are having   7
any meaningful influence, other than embarrassing the respective governments through the impact on public 
opinion.  
 
 
On the whole, decisions on monetary policy have been consistent with the policy framework, while fiscal 
policy has not been too out of line. The slippage on deficits can be attributed principally to the lethargy of 
the recovery, though some critics claim that Germany and others might have done more in the favourable 
economic climate of the early years of the euro to “consolidate” their budgets. Meanwhile, structural reforms 
continue to be difficult to achieve. This suggests that the problems of governance lie more with the policy 
framework. Six main strands of criticism can be enumerated: 
– First, both monetary policy and fiscal policy are considered to be too focused on stability and not 
enough on growth. This is, in part, the result of the dominance of a single “model” of how the econ-
omy works, but it also reflects the institutional separation of policymaking and the dominant posi-
tion of the single monetary policy vis-à-vis fragmented fiscal policy, and is compounded (Pisani-
Ferry, 2002) by the uncertainty about what macroeconomic policy should try to do. 
– Second, the rules governing fiscal policy are pro-cyclical to the extent that governments (for ex-
ample, Germany at present) are pushed to engage in fiscal tightening in a downturn, but do not face 
pressures for fiscal consolidation in good times and consequently lack incentives to do so. Thus, fis-
cal policy is too tight in a downturn and too loose in an up-turn and the overall impact is destabiliz-
ing. 
– A third concern is that the policy machinery relies too much on rules that have no evident eco-
nomic logic to them and that the underlying objectives become lost. The reference value for mone-
tary policy and the use of concurrent fiscal ratios irrespective of the point in the cycle can be con-
sidered too crude, and conceivably lead to ill-judged responses. Moreover, the underlying purpose 
of fiscal restraint – sound public finances – is not easily captured in simple rules. As Pisani-Ferry 
(2002) points out, “there is wide agreement on the need for fiscal discipline in a monetary union, but 
there are several problems with our current definition of it.” He refers especially to the use of current 
rather than cyclically adjusted ratios, the neglect of public debt and of off balance-sheet public lia-
bilities. In addition, the comment in a recent Commission Communication on reform of the SGP that 
“the process of budgetary consolidation has ground to a halt since 1999, and in some cases has re-
versed” (Commission, 2002b) is symptomatic of a broader concern that the Pact does not (and can-
not) promote fiscal discipline effectively. 
– The fourth criticism is to question whether the same rule makes sense for all Member States. In 
particular, a heavily indebted country that runs a deficit is at much greater risk of fiscal instability or 
indeed solvency problems. Equally, if a country has a good case for raising public spending – most 
obviously to bolster investment  – the rules ostensibly inhibit such spending.  
– Fifth, it is evident that demand-side and supply-side policies are inadequately integrated, and also 
that there are gaps within the supply-side “processes” – see TEPSA (2003).
3 
– Finally, the ease with which some (especially larger) Member States have been able to flout (or at 
least appear to flout) the fiscal rules undermines their credibility. France, most prominently, has as-
serted its right to choose when to meet the medium-term targets of the SGP and, in so doing, has in-
flamed an already delicate dispute between larger and smaller Member States. The reluctance to 
comply is exacerbated by the nature of the enforcement mechanisms and sanctions. Giving Ecofin 
discretion to determine when early warnings should be issued – and ducking the hard choice at vir-
tually the first time of asking – suggests that asking a peer group to judge a potentially delinquent 
Member State is unlikely to work. 
                                                 
3A study for the European Parliament on the 2003 Broad Economic Policy, to be published shortly as study ECON 133 
entitled A Background to the European Economic Policy 2003. 
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These problems point to a number of obvious potential directions for reform, with the emphasis on rethink-
ing the system of governance rather than the rules themselves. They also highlight the importance of opti-
mizing between hard and soft approaches, and reform will also need to take heed of a number of apparent 
paradoxes in the functioning of the system. 
Paradoxes 
EMU, as an economic system, clearly has to have economic coordination, as provided for in Article 99 of the 
Treaty, if policy anarchy is to be avoided. But there are a several inconsistencies or, indeed, paradoxes in-
herent in the system. First, the supposedly hard rules are regularly breached by both the monetary and fiscal 
authorities. Yet it is generally agreed that the ultimate sanctions in the SGP (fines for delinquent Member 
States) are designed not to be used. Instead, it seems to be soft sanctions (for example, “naming and sham-
ing”) and the political problems – above all domestically – of being seen to be in the wrong, that force gov-
ernments to change course.  
 
A second paradox is that the soft processes cannot be enforced and it will be all too easy for Member States 
to opt out of coordination precisely when it becomes most necessary. This may be the result of a lack of 
credible incentives as much as prospective sanctions: it can be argued that the strong target of entry into 
stage 3 of EMU provided substantial incentives to governments to conform to a coordination system, but in 
the current system, the rewards are lesser. 
 
Third, the least tractable structural problems are regarded as off limits for policy coordination, not because 
coordinated action, as such, is adjudged to be the wrong approach, but because the governments have been 
loath to take the first steps. Thus, in employment policy, modernization of the regulatory framework has 
been very timid, while wage flexibility is not confronted. An interesting slant on the various supply-side 
policies is contained a line in the 2003 spring Presidency Conclusions  (European Council, 2003) in which 
the “European Council invites the Commission in preparing its report for 2004, to analyse the measurable 
differences which Lisbon’s integrated approach has brought about, and assess how Member States have 
achieved this success and improved their position, including showing how the Lisbon objectives are being 
achieved through regulatory reform.” Reading this, the impression is that the evidence is less than 
compelling. 
 
A further paradox is that a supposedly rule-based system, with hard law provisions governing both fiscal and 
monetary policy, relies so heavily on soft procedures – dialogue and consultation, as shown in the chart – to 
achieve a coherent policy mix. Despite the aim, articulated in the 2003 spring Presidency conclusions, of 
achieving “a more comprehensive, efficient and coherent approach” within which “sound macroeconomic 
policies must be pursued in order to restore confidence and economic growth,” the means of achieving both 
the horizontal coordination of fiscal policy and the mix with monetary policy are not spelled out. In the 2003 
BEPGs, the aim is “stabilising output around a higher and sustainable growth trend,” yet when the it comes to 
how, the emphasis is predominantly on fiscal and supply-side policies, with no reference to monetary policy. 
 
The challenges confronting coordination 
A challenge for coordination, plainly, is to deliver integrated policy, even if many economists (including 
such influential figures as Otmar Issing at the ECB: see, Issing, 2002; Alesina et al., 2001) are skeptical about 
the need for more extensive and explicit macroeconomic policy coordination in the EU. They argue that, al-
though a case can be just about be made on theoretical grounds for a “policy mix” approach in which fiscal 
and monetary policy are set jointly, any possible benefits are heavily outweighed by political economy con-
siderations. Issing believes that it would lead to confusion in responsibilities and objectives, and could 
undermine the credibility of monetary policy. Indeed, it could be argued that if any central bank is genuinely 
to be independent, then it simply cannot countenance any form of coordination that might lead it to compro-
mise its mandate. Many other economists disagree vehemently and argue not only that coordination between 
fiscal and monetary policy ought to occur, but also that there are dangers in pinning so much on a single   9
view of how the economy works. The notion that there can only be one feasible strategy for euro area policy 
is rejected by the latter group. 
 
The alternative view is that piecemeal coordination – a range of procedures and coordinating bodies, with 
fiscal policies under one set, employment under another and very loose means of achieving “Lisbon” aims – 
is not enough and that they should be reinforced by a powerful counterweight to the ECB, fulfilling functions 
similar to those of the Finance Minister in a Member State. Just as Javier Solana has a mandate to bring to-
gether national foreign policies, there is a case for what French advocates call gouvernement économique to 
bring together economic policies. The Eurogroup, in a limited way, does this at present, but is an informal 
body with limited authority. 
 
Can better, more effective coordination, possibly with a fresh approach to the implementation of hard and 
soft mechanisms, be achieved? In the last year or so, the procedures for policy coordination have come un-
der intense scrutiny. The current imbroglio focuses attention especially on the respective merits of hard and 
soft means of policy coordination. Although once again it is the SGP which has been to the fore, the outcome 
will also see major changes in the way soft coordination functions. The aim of the changes is, above all, to 
achieve better coordination of the various forms of coordination, while also making it more strategic in char-
acter: “streamlining” is the watchword. Yet it is also apparent that, paradoxically, it is in the soft policy 
arena that a way forward has been settled, whereas reform of the SGP remains in abeyance. Thus, the BEPGs 
have been shifted from an annual to a triennial cycle (albeit with provision for annual updates), while the 
Employment Guidelines have not only been reorientated towards medium-term “Lisbon” objectives (2010), 
but have also been significantly remodeled: the “ten commandments” (see box 1).  
 
The draft 2003 BEPGs adopted in early April by the Commission do now relate employment objectives to 
those in the parallel employment guidelines: indeed, the relevant passages in the BEPGs explicitly mention 
the individual employment guidelines to which they relate. Similarly, the Employment Guidelines stress the 
need for a common approach noting that “the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines provide the overarching 
economic policy coordination for the European Union.” All the right words are articulated in the promise “to 
increase transparency and efficiency, avoid overlap and repetitions in the formulation of guidelines, and en-
sure consistency, complementarity and coherence.” As always, it looks good…  
 
But the draft BEPGs (Commission, 2003d) again illustrate the core policy-mix problem in the ultimately 
pointless statement (given that it paraphrases what the Treaty says) that: “Monetary authorities should 
pursue price stability and, subject to this being achieved, support the general economic policies.” 
 
This is followed by three rather bland recommendations concerning: respect for the “close to balance or in 
surplus” rule and a commitment to improve the cyclically adjusted budget balance by 0.5 percent of GDP; the 
avoidance of pro-cyclical policies, especially in anticipation of a return to growth, coupled with stronger co-
ordination; and wage moderation.
4 Moreover, the text addressed to the euro area risks being seen as “moth-
erhood and apple pie” recommendations, rather than anything with bite (see box 2). What this illustrates is 
the inherent difficulty in a soft, strategic process of saying enough to be meaningful and constructive in 
highlighting problems, being broad enough to be strategic, yet respecting subsidiarity and national sensitivi-
ties. 
 
Thus, despite the reform initiatives of the last year, key coordination challenges are likely to remain un-
resolved. A crucial question is whether the political will, not to mention the means, exists to assure compli-
ance with the agreements. For hard policy coordination this could well be crunch time: can a reformed SGP 
                                                 
4It could be argued that the conjunction of a recommendation to move towards balance – even softened by the reference 
to the cyclically adjusted budget position – and one about the avoidance of pro-cyclical fiscal policy is oxymoronic (or 
perhaps the “oxy” should be deleted…). 
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be made to fulfill its designated role, or should a different approach to fiscal policy coordination now be put 
in place? A key characteristic of soft coordination is that it encourages policy learning and enhancement, and 
can thus be portrayed as having positive rather than disciplining functions. But to the extent that soft proc-
esses also have to constrain Member State discretion in the pursuit of common aims, can they be effective, 
and if so, how? 
 
Conclusions and suggestions for reform 
 
Any system of economic management has to balance competing aims and a continuing worry about the pro-
posals for reform of the ECB and the SGP is that they are too tame. Stability remains the focus, with little con-
cession to growth imperatives such as the acknowledged need to accelerate and support structural reforms. 
In addition, the reforms would still not allow for optimizing the policy mix, whether by coordinating na-
tional fiscal positions or providing a means of integrating fiscal, monetary and supply-side policies. Even so, 
a cursory look at how policy is being coordinated in the EU shows not only that there is much of it going on, 
but also that it is being done through an eclectic range of approaches. The underlying question, however, is 
whether current arrangements provide a policy framework that is robust enough for what EMU will become 
five, ten or twenty years hence.  
 
In particular, can the present reliance on the OMC for so many important areas of supply-side policy survive 
and prosper? On this, the jury is out, but there are other facets of policy coordination that also warrant more 
thought. At the heart of the matter is what the EU has become, or is moving towards, as a system for eco-
nomic governance. If the finalité économique is to be a substantially integrated European economy as is im-
plicit in Article 2 of the Treaty, not to mention the rhetoric surrounding the single market and the necessity 
for it of a single currency, then Member State economic policies will have to be more closely aligned. If they 
are not, tensions in the system will inevitably grow, making it more difficult to maintain the integrity of the 
single market.  
 
Towards reform 
The starting point for reform must be to review the overall economic governance system for EMU in the light 
of “streamlining.” It is a new policy regime that would be damaged if it were radically altered, but equally it 
must adapt and change where there are problems. An incremental approach to reform is therefore called for. 
An obvious resolution of the first two paradoxes outlined above would be simultaneously to soften the hard 
processes and to harden the soft processes. Placing the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines rather than the 
SGP at the core of coordination is an important start. Their thrust is less on fiscal discipline, narrowly de-
fined, and more on the overall conduct of economic policy, including better integration of the supply side.  
One key development is the establishment, in the context of rationalizing – or perhaps re-weighting – the 
Council formations, of the Competitiveness Council. While it should give greater coherence to the supply 
side, it remains to be seen whether the gaps in supply-side coordination can be bridged. 
 
Maintaining coherence and discipline will never be easy and there are no easy answers for delinquent Mem-
ber States. Compliance is more likely to be assured if there is, first, a minimum of ambiguity and if targets 
make economic sense. Attention to the logic and definition of rules and targets would help and a shift to cy-
clically or structurally adjusted deficits would be an obvious first step. The adoption of a “golden-rule” for 
fiscal policy under which higher levels of public investment could be justified on “Lisbon” grounds (Creel et 
al., 2002). Although such a rule would require careful definition and monitoring of eligible investments, the 
problems are not insuperable. Moreover, a golden rule need not be a loose rule: if necessary the benchmark 
could be set at a figure below zero, and there might well be scope for setting differentiated targets depending 
on national circumstances, for example impending pensions obligations. But there also has to be a political 
commitment to act responsibly, with the corollary of a political price to be paid for transgression. Giving the 
Commission or an independent body, rather than Ecofin, the authority to issue warnings would be an im-
provement. 
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More radical proposals should, nevertheless, be explored. Scharpf (2002), in looking at social policy, has ad-
vocated what he calls framework directives as a means of providing legal underpinning to the OMC. It can be 
argued that the case for doing so in relation to the BEPGs might be stronger still, as it would be a means of 
enhancing their disciplining role. “Punishments” such as withholding of Structural Funds’ payments have 
been mentioned, but would probably poison relationships rather than help. Instead, it is important to look be-
yond a narrow, disciplining view of economic governance both to ensure that the underlying economic pol-
icy aims are not forgotten and that political commitment to successful policy – even if it is awkward in the 
short term – is reinforced. In this context political input should be boosted rather than considered secondary. 
Perhaps a gouvernement économique, a much more political body with both the clout to stand up to the ECB 
and the authority to shape economic policy at the EU level, is the answer (Boyer, 1999 and 2002; Jacquet 
and Pisani-Ferry, 2001).  
 
Three different arguments can be adduced in support of this notion. The first is that there is simply an im-
balance in power that could result in too great a weight being assigned to narrowly monetary objectives, and 
not enough to the real economy, although some would argue that a low inflation environment is, itself, a pre-
condition for raising the sustainable growth rate (Alesina et al. 2001). Second, some form of centralized eco-
nomic power may be necessary to coordinate and agree the conduct of policy, with the implication that the 
existing coordination machinery is not sufficient for this purpose. This second argument has mainly been ar-
ticulated in relation to fiscal policy, but could, as discussed above, conceivably be extended to embrace the 
supply-side policies. In this regard, Pisani-Ferry (2002) advocates starting with at least a dialogue between 
the ECB and the Eurogroup on the interaction between structural reform and macroeconomic policy. 
 
A third factor is that unless there is scope for political input in arriving at agreed decisions, policy making 
will take place within a normative vacuum. A closely related question is whether there is a single ‘true 
model’ of the contemporary capitalist economy towards which all but the misguided will want to converge. 
In appraising the case for gouvernement économique an important consideration is whether much of eco-
nomic policy can ultimately be reduced to technical choices or has such significant distributive conse-
quences that the political dimension must inevitably be paramount. The EMU system is, on the whole, in the 
former camp. An independent central bank, fiscal policy constrained by rules and attempts to chart a com-
mon way forward on the supply-side all point towards both the technical paradigm and the existence of an 
agreed model. Yet even the apparently minor spat in 2001 between the Commission and the Irish govern-
ment over how big a budgetary surplus Ireland should run revealed not just conflicting views on the under-
lying economics, but also the relevance of political aims.  
 
To sum up, the case for a gouvernement économique looks compelling in some respects, yet remains paper-
thin in others. In particular the continuing opposition of so many Member States (see Solbes, 2002), but-
tressed by the principle of subsidiarity, means that it lacks political credibility at present. The history of 
European integration, however, contains many examples of institutional developments that seemed implausi-
ble just a few years beforehand – consider how far common defence has moved – so that the political ob-
stacles could easily fade.  
 
As the Convention completes its business and paves the way for the 2004 IGC, attention will also focus on 
how the system of economic governance of the euro area and the soon-to-be-enlarged EU as a whole should 
develop. This paper has tried to highlight a number of areas in which reforms and enhancements of the sys-
tem will be under the microscope. Some of the possible changes would entail difficult political choices and 
legislative action that would arouse controversy, but others would require no more than “tweaking” of 
present arrangements. Will our leaders be bold enough? 
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Box 1:  The Employment “Ten commandments” 
To support the three objectives of full employment,  
quality and productivity at work  
and cohesion and an inclusive labour market,  
the new guidelines identify ten priorities (“ten commandments”) for action: 
 
1. help unemployed and inactive to find a job, prevent long-term unemployment
2. encourage entrepreneurship and improve climate for business start-ups 
3. promote adaptability of workers and firms to change 
4. provide more and better investment in human capital 
5. increase labour supply and promote active ageing 
6. promote gender equality in employment and pay 
7. combat discrimination against disadvantaged groups 
8. improve financial incentives to make work pay 
9. reduce undeclared work substantially 
10. promote occupational and geographical mobility 